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Tobacco Abuse and Disability Benefits:
Response to the 2003 Meisburg Analysis
By Kathryn A. Kroggel *
I. INTRODUCTION
Tobacco abuse is the leading cause of preventable disease and
death in the United States, contributing to over 440,000 deaths a
year.' Studies link tobacco use to over thirty distinct illnesses, as
well as to effects on, or damage to, almost every organ in the body
and a person's overall general health.2 Cigarettes came to the
*Ms. Kroggel is an associate at the Law Offices of William C. Haynes in
Lancaster, PA. J.D, Pennsylvania State University - Dickinson School of Law;
B.A. in English and American Literature, Hofstra University. The author wishes to
express her thanks to Robert E. Rains, for his invaluable aid in the writing and
publication of this article, and to Mark Podvia, for his research assistance.
1. United States Public Heath Services, 2004 Surgeon General's Report, The
Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General, Executive
Summary, 14, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr_-2004/pdf/executivesummary.pdf (last visited
November 7, 2004) [hereinafter "2004 Surgeon General's Report"].
2. Id. at Thl 1.1. The 2004 Surgeon General's Report identifies the following
diseases found to be caused by, or substantially linked to, smoking: cancers,
including bladder cancer, cervical cancer, esophageal cancer, kidney cancer,
laryngeal cancer, leukemia, lung cancer, oral cancer, pancreatic cancer, and
stomach cancer; cardiovascular diseases, including abdominal aortic aneurysm,
atherosclerosis, cerebrovascular disease, and coronary heart disease; respiratory
diseases, including chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, pneumonia, respiratory
effects in utero including reduced infant lung function, respiratory effects in
childhood and adolescence including impaired lung growth, early onset lung
function decline, coughing, phlegm, wheezing, and asthma related symptoms,
respiratory effects in adults, including premature onset of and accelerated lung
function decline, coughing, phlegm, wheezing, dyspnea, and poor asthma control;
reproductive effects, including sudden infant death syndrome, reduced fertility in
women, fetal growth restrictions and low birth weight, and pregnancy
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forefront of American tobacco consumption in the 1920's;
consumption increased over the next twenty-five years, saw a large
increase during World War II among both men and women, and hit
its high point in the 1960's at a rate of over 4,000 cigarettes
consumed per adult per year.3 Temporary declines in consumption
patterns have been observed over the years, generally coinciding with
times of increased public concern over the health hazards of
smoking.4 However, recent data suggests that current smoking
prevalence is highest among men, persons living below the poverty
level, and persons who have dropped out of high school.5
It has also been suggested, by Administrative Law Judge John
Marshall Meisburg Jr., that "smoking and disability" - meaning the
determination of disability for purposes of federal disability benefits
under Title II (Social Security Disability Insurance benefits,
complications such as premature rupture of the membranes, placenta previa,
placental abruption, preterm delivery and shortened gestation; and other
impairments, including nuclear cataract, diminished health status/morbidity, hip
fractures, low bone density, and peptic ulcer disease. Id.
3. MATTHEW BENDER & Co., ATTORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, pt.209.11
(3rd. ed. 2004) [hereinafter "Attorney's Textbook of Medicine"].
4. Id.
Temporary declines in U.S. per capita cigarette consumption
were observed in the intervals from 1953 to 1954, in 1964, and
from 1968 to 1970; available data suggest that these figures
represent primarily individuals' cessation of the smoking habit.
It is believed that the declines in consumption may have
coincided with periods of increased publicity concerning the
health hazards of cigarette smoking - e.g., the first report of the
Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General (1964), The Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act... and The Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act.
Id., citing Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (1966); Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970).
5. Id. at 209.13, citing the Social Security Act.
The smoking prevalence of men (27.7%) was significantly higher
than that of women (22.5%)... Persons living below the poverty
level had higher smoking prevalences (sic) (32.1%) than those
living at or above the poverty level (23.8%). Among individuals
with 9 years of education, prevalences varied inversely with
educational level. The highest smoking prevalence was observed
in men who had dropped out of high school (42.1%).
Attorney's Textbook of Medicine, supra note 3, at pt.290.13.
hereinafter "SSD") and Title XVI (Supplemental Security Income
benefits, hereinafter "SSI") of the Social Security Act (hereinafter
"the Act") - "go hand in hand" - meaning that a substantial portion
of disability claimants are also smokers.6 This suggestion that
"smoking and disability are inextricably intertwined"7 raises
questions about the level of impact tobacco abuse has on the
determination of disability for purposes of SSI and SSD, and how the
courts treat claimants who abuse tobacco.
There are several potential places in the disability evaluation
process where current, continued tobacco use could result in a denial
of benefits; in his most recent article discussing the issue, Judge
Meisburg states that "[u]nder the law, disability benefits can and
should be denied . . ." to these claimants, largely because such
denials would have a "public policy salutary effect" by saving Social
Security trust fund money and motivating current smokers to quit.
8
Do the courts agree with such a course of action? Does experience
with the treatment of other drugs under the Social Security Act
support the public policy arguments articled by Judge Meisburg for
denying benefits to smokers?
This article will address these and other questions by examining
the law involved in the determination of disability when tobacco
abuse is involved. Part II of this article will provide an overview of
the Social Security Act and the sequential evaluation process used to
determine whether a claimant is disabled such that he or she may
receive federal benefits under the Act. This section will highlight
potential problem areas in the process where tobacco abuse could
result in a denial of benefits, particularly the two areas addressed by
Judge Meisburg: the requirement that claimants must follow
prescribed medical treatment and the Drug Addiction and Alcoholism
("DA&A") analysis.9
Part III will examine issues that arise when the argument is made
that continued tobacco abuse constitutes a failure to follow
prescribed medical treatment. Specifically, Part III will discuss how
the courts have handled the issues of "prescribed" treatment versus
6. The Hon. John Marshall Meisburg, Jr., Smoking, Nicotine, and Disability: A
2003 Update, FED. LAW. Sept. 2003, 36.
7. Id. at 40.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 36-40.
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"suggested" treatment, whether addiction to tobacco constitutes good
cause for failure to stop smoking, and whether the required showing
that cessation of smoking would restore the claimant to health. This
section concludes that, while there is a split in the circuits on these
issues, several of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have adopted a more
lenient treatment of smokers than that suggested by Judge Meisburg,
and have placed a relatively heavy burden of proof on the finder of
fact.
Part IV of this article will provide a look at the details of the
DA&A analysis as the courts have applied it. This section then
argues that, contrary to the position of Judge Meisburg, nicotine
abuse may not fall under the DA&A analysis. Part IV will also
address the particular public policy justifications articulated by Judge
Meisburg as to why DA&A analysis should apply to smokers,
concluding that past experience relating to the efficacy of the DA&A
analysis suggests that application of the analysis to smokers would
not have the "public policy salutary effect" suggested by Judge
Meisburg. 10
Finally, Part V offers a summary of and conclusions about the
current state of the law with respect to disability benefits and tobacco
abuse. This section argues that while it is possible to deny benefits to
smokers based on tobacco abuse, a blanket rule denying benefits
simply because the claimant is a smoker is unwarranted by the
current state of the law and may not be the wisest course of action in
terms of beneficial public policy.
II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION, AND
POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS
A. Relevant Amendments to the Social Security Act
In 1956, Congress created a program of disability insurance, or
the SSD, by amending the Social Security Act, which provided for
retirement programs and survivor's benefits." As originally passed,
lO. Id.
11. For a concise overview of the evolution of the Social Security Act, with an
emphasis on the history of the DA&A analysis, see Dru Stevenson, Should Addicts
Get Welfare? Addiction & SSI/SSDI, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 185, 187-93; see also
Sharon R. Hunt & Jim Baumohl, Drink, Drugs, and Disability: An Introduction to
the 1956 SSD program paid benefits to those persons between the
ages of fifty and sixty-five who had paid into the system based on
their earnings, and were no longer able to "engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be
of long-continued and indefinite duration." 12 SSD coverage was
expanded by later amendments to provide benefits to dependents 3
and to remove the lower age restriction.' 4
Congress further supplemented these programs in 1972 with the
creation of SSI, specifically designed to aid individuals in poverty
that were too disabled to work. 15 Under this program, individuals that
were found to be disabled under the five-step sequential evaluation
process explained in detail below could receive a monthly cash
benefit.' 6  In 1989, the Act was further amended to recognize
alcoholism and addiction as qualifying impairments under the
sequential evaluation; however, recipients of SSI benefits based on
such impairments were subject to certain limitations, such as the
requirement that they participate in treatment programs and that they
designate a representative payee to manage their benefits.1
7
In 1994, due to rising costs for the SSI program and public
concern over the growing number of addicts receiving federal
benefits,' 8 Congress passed the Social Security Independence and
Program Improvements Act, which placed a thirty-six month time
limit on benefits available to alcoholics and addicts, expanded the
scope of the 1989 limitations to encompass both SSI and SSD
the Controversy, 30 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 9 (reviewing the history of the
treatment of drug addicts and alcoholics under the Act and the politics underlying
the creation of the DA&A analysis).
12. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1956).
13. Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, 72 Stat. 1013
(1958).
14. Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924
(1960).
15. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329
(1972).
16. Id.
17. 20 C.F.R. 404(P)(1)(A) § 12.09 (1989); see also Stevenson, supra note 11,
at 188-89, Hunt, supra note 11, at 31.
18. Stevenson, supra note 11, at 190-91; see also Hunt, supra note 11, at 37-
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benefits, and provided that failure to comply with treatment would
result in the suspension of benefits. 9 However, the number of
beneficiaries continued to grow;2" the Congressional explanation for
this growth was that federal benefits provided an incentive for
alcoholics or addicts not to seek proper treatment.2'
In order to rectify this perceived problem with the then-existing
benefits systems, Congress passed the Contract with America
Advancement Act of 1996, which denied SSI or SSD benefits to
claimants whose addiction is "a contributing factor material to their
disability.22 This standard, discussed in detail below, essentially
requires the finder of fact in a benefits determination to decide
whether the claimant would still be disabled within the meaning of
the Act but for the alcohol abuse or drug addiction.
B. The Sequential Evaluation
In order to qualify for SSD benefits, the claimant must meet the
insured status requirements, 23 be less than sixty-five years of age, and
be under a "disability," as defined by the Act.24 In order to qualify
for SSI benefits, a claimant must be a resident of the United States
with limited resources, and be over the age of sixty-five, blind, or
qualify as "disabled" under the Act.25 In the case of both SSD and
19. Social Security Independence and Program Improvement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464 (1994).
20. Hunt, supra note 11, at 27, Fig. 1 (chart demonstrating the growth in the
SSI DA&A rolls from December 1975 through June 1996).
21. Stevenson, supra note 11, at 191.
22. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
110 Stat. 852 (1996); see also Stevenson, supra note 11, at 192.
23. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130 (2004) (explaining the rules for determining
disability insured status).
24. See e.g., Flint v. Sullivan, 951 F.2d 264, 267 (10th Cir. 1991).
25. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (2005). This regulation sets out other requirements
for eligibility. It also restates the thirty-six month limitation on benefits for
alcoholics and addicts eligibility requirements put in place by the Social Security
Independence and Program Improvement Act of 1994:
You are disabled, drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing
factor material to the determination of disability, and you have
not previously received a total of 36 months of Social Security
benefit payments when appropriate treatment was available or
SSI benefits for adults, 26 a five-step sequential evaluation process is
used to determine whether a claimant is disabled.27
Step one in the sequential evaluation process is determining
whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity (SGA). 28  This is defined as work that involves "doing
significant and productive physical or mental duties," and is "done
(or intended) for pay or profit." 29 If the claimant is engaged in a
36 months of SSI benefits on the basis of disability where drug
addiction or alcoholism was a contributing factor material to the
determination of disability.
20 C.F.R. § 416.202(e) (2005), citing Social Security Independence and Program
Improvement Act of 1994, supra note 19.
26. The determination of disability in children for SSI purposes is made using
a three-step sequential evaluation process that asks: (1) if the child is engaged in
substantial gainful activity, (2) has an impairment that is severe and meets the
durational requirement, and (3) whether that impairment meets, medically equals,
or functionally equals a listing in the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924
(2005), citing 20 C.F.R. pt.404, subpt.P, app.l (pt.B). It is beyond the scope of this
article to consider in detail the impact of tobacco abuse in disability determinations
for children. However, the issue has relevance because the latest Surgeon
General's Report shows that, while the percentage of current minor smokers has
been reduced since 1997, the trend in reduction has slowed appreciably. Tobacco
abuse has also been linked to many diseases that affect children, both before they
are born and as they grow. See 2004 Surgeon General's Report, supra note 1, at 14
(for statistics on tobacco use in minors) and Tbl. 1.1 (for description of diseases in
children linked to tobacco abuse). However, the Social Security Administration
Programs Operating Manual System (hereinafter "POMS") states that, for the
purposes of invoking the application of the DA&A analysis, "[m]edically
determinable substance use disorders ... [d]o not include medical conditions that
arise from a mother's use of alcohol or drugs during pregnancy (e.g., fetal alcohol
syndrome or "crack baby" cases)," thereby eliminating several classes of diseases
recognized by the Surgeon General as caused by tobacco abuse. Social Security
Administration Policy Site, Programs Operating Manual, § DI 90070.050(C)(2),
available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0490070050!opendocument (last
visited Oct. 25, 2005).
27. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920 (2005) (regarding SSD and SSI determinations, respectively).
28. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),
416.920(a)(4)(i) (2005) (regarding SSD reference determinations and SSI
determinations, respectively).
29. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910 (2005) (regarding SSD reference
determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
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SGA, he or she is not disabled and the evaluation ceases.30 However,
if the claimant is not engaged in a SGA, the evaluation proceeds to
step two; at this point, the fact finder must determine whether the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that
meets the durational requirement. 31
If the finder of fact determines that the claimant has a severe
impairment(s), step three of the sequential evaluation asks whether
that impairment(s) meets or equals any impairment in the Listing of
Impairments; 32 if a claimant has such an impairment, it warrants a
finding of "disabled. '' 33  If the claimant cannot show such an
impairment, the inquiry moves to step four, where the claimant's
residual functional capacity to do work activity is assessed 34 and used
to determine whether the claimant can still do his or her past relevant
work.35 If the claimant can return to his or her past relevant work, a
30. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b) (2005) (regarding SSD reference
determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
31. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920(a)(4)(ii)
(2005) (regarding SSD reference determinations and SSI determinations,
respectively). The durational requirement is as follows: "Unless your impairment
is expected to result in death, it must have lasted or must be expected to last for a
continuous period of at least 12 months." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909 (2005)
(regarding SSD reference determinations and SSI determinations, respectively)
(emphasis added). In defining the required level of severity, the SSA regulations
state that an impairment is not severe "if it does not significantly limit your
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities" meaning "the abilities and
aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921 (2005)
(regarding SSD reference determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
32. 20 C.F.R. pt.404, subpt.P, app. 1 (pt. A). Part A of the Listings deals with
impairments in adults and is divided into the following fourteen categories of
impairments: Musculoskeletal System (1.00), Special Senses and Speech (2.00),
Respiratory System (3.00), Cardiovascular System (4.00), Digestive System (5.00),
Genito-Urinary System (6.00), Hemic and Lymphatic System (7.00), Skin (8.00),
Endocrine System (9.00), Multiple Body Systems (10.00), Neurological (11.00),
Mental Disorders (12.00), Neoplastic Diseases, Malignant (13.00), Immune System
(14.00). Part B of the Listings deals with impairments in children and is divided
into similar categories of impairments.
33. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d) (2005) (regarding SSD reference
determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
34. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (2005) (regarding SSD reference
determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
35. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv) (2005) (regarding SSD
reference determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
finding of "not disabled" will be made. 36  The final step in the
sequential evaluation is for the finder of fact to determine whether
the claimant could make the adjustment to any other work, taking
into consideration the claimant's residual functional capacity, age,
education, and past work experience.37 If the claimant would be
unable to make the adjustment, he or she is "disabled" for SSI and
SSD purposes.
38
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four.
As detailed above, if the claimant fails to meet the burden of proof at
any of these steps, except at step three, a finding of "not disabled"
will be entered. The burden then shifts to the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration to show that the claimant is not
disabled. 39
C. Potential Problem Areas with Respect to Continued Tobacco
Abuse
Under the current federal benefits system, there are two major
potential areas where continued, current tobacco abuse could enter
into the disability determination and result in the denial of benefits.
First, a finding that the claimant is not disabled may be entered if, at
any time, the finder of fact determines that the claimant has failed in
the duty to follow prescribed medical treatment if such treatment
could restore the claimant to the work force.40 In short, the argument
can be made that claimant's continued tobacco abuse after their
doctor has advised them to stop using tobacco can be seen as
exacerbating the debilitating condition(s), such that if the claimant
were to stop, they would no longer be disabled.
36. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f) (2005) (regarding SSD reference
determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
37. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v) (2005) (regarding SSD
reference determinations and SSI determinations, respectively); see also Williams
v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 850-52 (10th Cir. 1988).
38. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g) (2005) (regarding SSD reference
determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
39. Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
40. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text; see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1530, 416.930 (2005) (regarding SSD reference determinations and SSI
determinations, respectively).
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Second, it is possible that nicotine abuse could fall under the
DA&A analysis. 41 The DA&A analysis functions almost as a "sixth
step" in the sequential evaluation. This allows the finder of fact to
determine that claimants are not disabled even if they have
successfully passed the previous five steps, if the claimants'
alcoholism or addiction is a contributing factor material to the
disability.42
III. FAILURE TO QUIT AS FAILURE TO FOLLOW PRESCRIBED MEDICAL
TREATMENT
A. The Duty to Comply as a Per Se Rule
The current Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations
provide that the finder of fact in a claim for disability benefits may
make a finding of "not disabled" if the claimant has breached the
duty to comply with prescribed medical treatment.43  More
specifically:
41. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 95-133 and
accompanying text.
42. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a), 416.935(a) (2005) (regarding SSD reference
determinations and SSI determinations, respectively). "If we find that you are
disabled and have medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism, we must
determine whether your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor
material to the determination of disability." Id. (emphasis added). This language
suggests that the DA&A analysis is applied to the case only after the completion of
the five-step sequential evaluation. However, there is case law which suggests that
even though the DA&A analysis arguably functions as a sixth step, the Contract
with America Advancement Act did not specifically alter the mandated five-step
sequential evaluation and thus it is inappropriate to refer to the DA&A analysis as a
"sixth step" in the evaluation. See, e.g., Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1280
(11 th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 1999). However,
several courts have held that application of the DA&A analysis is premature unless
a finding of "disabled" has been made under the five-step sequential evaluation.
See, e.g., Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2001), Drapeau
v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2001). For purposes of this
article, I will refer to the DA&A analysis as a sixth step because I find it to be a
useful way to understand the interplay between the five-step sequential evaluation
and DA&A analysis.
43. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (2005) (regarding SSD reference
determinations and SSI determinations, respectively).
In order to get benefits, you must follow treatment
prescribed by your physician if this treatment can
restore your ability to work .... If you do not follow
the prescribed treatment without a good reason, we
will not find you disabled or, if you are already
receiving benefits, we will stop paying you benefits. 4
As noted by Judge Meisburg, federal courts have held that a
claimant's "failure to stop smoking cigarettes against the advice of a
treating physician can constitute the failure to follow prescribed
treatment under SSA regulations. 45 Case law from the Sixth Circuit,
the Eighth Circuit, and district courts following Eighth Circuit
precedent appears to support this per se rule, holding that the failure
to quit smoking constitutes the failure to follow prescribed treatment
whenever this is even mentioned in the claimant's medical records by
a treating physician. However, a closer look at these cases reveals
that, in the majority, the failure to stop smoking was merely one
factor supporting the decision to deny benefits, not the sole basis of
the denial. 47 This suggests that the precedent favoring a per se rule
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 38.
46. See e.g., Kisling v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1255 (8th Cir. 1997); Higgins v.
Callahan, 983 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Meeks v. Apfel, 993 F. Supp. 1265
(W.D. Mo. 1997); Roth v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 279 (8th Cir. 1995); Sias v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., 861 F.2d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 1988); Bledsoe v. Bowen,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15130 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
47. Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir. 1998); Kisling, 105 F.3d at
1257 (holding that Commissioner's determination that claimant's physical and
mental impairments do not inhibit her ability to perform her past relevant work was
supported by medical evidence in the record, the fact that the claimant failed to quit
smoking despite advice from her doctor, and the court's proper assessment of
witness credibility); Higgins, 983 F. Supp. at 871 (holding that failure to stop
smoking mitigates against finding of disability); Meeks, 993 F. Supp. at 1276
(holding that plaintiffs failure to lose weight, exercise, and stop smoking
constituted a failure to follow prescribed treatment, however, the claim was denied
based on the court's determination of claimant's credibility as to the severity of his
impairments); Roth, 45 F.3d at 282 (claimant was advised to begin physical
reconditioning and stop smoking; the court found that he had failed to follow
prescribed treatment because he did not heed limit on lifting, did not exercise, and
did not take any medication); Sias, 861 F.2d at 480 (failure to quit smoking was
one factor supporting the court's determination of not disabled); Bledsoe, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15130 at 13 (court determined that claimant was not disabled
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can be reconciled with the more lenient reading of the "prescribed
treatment" rule that is more widely used in other circuits, as
described in detail below.
B. The Four-Factor Test for Failure to Comply
Evidence in a claimant's records that the claimant's treating
physician has indicated that smoking cessation is warranted need not
lead directly to a denial of benefits per se.48 A four-part test has been
developed by courts reviewing a denial of benefits based on failure to
follow prescribed treatment: (1) the treatment must have been
prescribed, (2) the treatment must have been refused, (3) the refusal
must have been without justifiable excuse, and (4) the treatment at
issue should be expected to restore the claimant's ability to work.49
The burden of proof is on the finder of fact to demonstrate that
substantial evidence") in the record supports each factor.5" The
application of this test raises key issues at every step which suggest
that denial of benefits to all smokers based on the "prescribed
treatment" regulations is not a blanket rule and is not the approach
favored by several circuits.5 2
based upon credibility determination, medical evidence in the record, claimant's
failure to stop smoking, and his own observations of the claimant at the hearing).
48. Judge Meisburg's 2003 article does briefly address the ideas of
"prescribed" versus "suggested" and addiction as good cause; however, he tends to
give short shrift to these ideas and seems to downplay the body of case law that is
more favorable to claimants who are also smokers. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 38-
39.
49. Weakley v. Heckler, 795 F.2d 64, 66 (10th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler,
702 F.2d 950, 953 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
50. "'Substantial evidence' is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion.' It may be less than a preponderance of the
evidence, but must be more than a mere scintilla." Ingram v. Barnhart, 72 F. App'x
631, 633 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)).
51. See e.g., Geubelle v. Barnhart, No. 02-1297-WEB, 2003 WL 22853100 (D.
Kan. Sept. 26, 2003); Carothers v. Heckler, 627 F. Supp. 301, 304 (W.D.N.C.
1985); Weakley, 795 F. 2d 66.
52. See infra notes 52-81 and accompanying text.
1. "Prescribed" v. "Suggested"
As stated in the SSA regulations, the finder of fact may only
make a finding of "not disabled" when the claimant has failed to
comply with prescribed medical treatment without good cause.
53
This language raises the question of what constitutes "prescribed
treatment," as laid out in the first factor of the test stated above.54
The Sixth Circuit has held that treatment which is merely
suggested or recommended does not constitute prescribed
treatment.55 In Harris v. Heckler, the Sixth Circuit held that
treatment must be ordered by a treating physician to constitute
prescribed treatment; if the treatment is not ordered it is characterized
as a recommendation.56 This distinction was more clearly defined by
the Tenth Circuit, which has held that "[r]ecommendations,
suggestions, and abstract opinions are not enough" to constitute
prescribed treatment under the Social Security regulations. 57  This
approach has been applied by the First and Eleventh Circuits, and
was recently applied by the District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama.58 The result is that with respect to the first factor, to satisfy
the burden of proof, the finder of fact must show that substantial
evidence in the record indicates that cessation of smoking was
ordered, not merely recommended or suggested, to rise to the level of
prescribed treatment which invokes the duty of compliance.
2. Role of Attempts to Quit and Addiction as "Good Reason"
To deny benefits, steps two and three of the test articulated above
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
55. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F. 2d 431, 435 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985). The dissent in
Harris argues that by "distinguishing a 'suggested course of treatment' from a
'prescribed course of treatment"' the majority "extols form over substance,"
however, Harris is still good law in the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 439 n.3 (Wellford, J.,
dissenting).
56. Harris, 756 F.2d at 435 n.2.
57. Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir. 1985).
58. Seals v. Barnhart, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (N.D. Ala. 2004); Jones v.
Heckler, 702 F.2d 950 (11th Cir. 1983); Schena v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 635 F. 2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980).
Fall 2005 Tobacco Abuse and Disability Benefits
470 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-2
require the finder of fact to show that the claimant refused prescribed
treatment and that such refusal was without justification.5 9 Assuming
that an order to stop smoking was given such that it constituted
"prescribed treatment," the courts have considered attempts to quit
smoking in relation to the second factor of the evaluation in relation
to "refusal" of treatment.60
In O'Donnell v. Barnhart, the Eighth Circuit held that when the
claimant has made several attempts to stop smoking, with the help of
prescription medications, the failure to stop smoking as failure to
follow prescribed treatment will not undermine her credibility. 6' The
Tenth Circuit has also adopted this approach with respect to attempts
to stop smoking, holding that the failure to stop smoking after
cessation has been advised by a treating physician does not militate
against a finding of disability where the record shows that the
claimant has made several attempts to quit and has significantly cut
back on his smoking as a result of medical advice.62 These cases
suggest that attempts to quit may mitigate against a finding of refusal
of treatment.
This standard was recently adopted and applied by the District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, holding that since the
record contained evidence of several attempts to stop smoking, a
"willful refusal" to follow treatment could not be assumed from "a
59. Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
60. Infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
61. O'Donnell v. Barnhart, 318 F.3d 811, 819 (8th Cir. 2003). Continued
tobacco abuse as a failure to follow prescribed medical treatment could enter into
the fact finder's determination of the claimant's credibility, especially in
determining credibility of the claimant's subjective complaints of disabling pain or
shortness of breath. The circuits are split on whether it is proper for the finder of
fact to consider tobacco abuse as non-compliance in making a credibility
determination in such cases. Compare Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding that it is a misuse of the non-compliance regulation to negatively
assess credibility), and Rousey v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that it was improper for the ALJ to find incredible claimant's complaints
of chest pain because she continued to smoke when the medical evidence in the
record did not demonstrate that her chest pain was directly linked to her continued
smoking), with McGeorge v. Barnhart, 321 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
non-compliance is a factor in the credibility determination in relation to allegations
of shortness of breath).
62. Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 149 n.16 (10th Cir. 1985).
mere failure to accomplish the recommended change."63 This court
overlapped the second and third factors and stated that "[g]uidance in
smoking cases can be found in case[s] involving recommendations to
lose weight," holding that the failure to stop smoking, like the failure
to lose weight, "[d]oes not constitute a refusal to undertake [a]
prescribed course of treatment," rather there must be something more
in the record to show willful refusal without good cause.64
With respect to the third factor, justification for the refusal to
follow prescribed treatment, the SSA regulations dealing with
prescribed treatment provide several examples of what will constitute
"good reason" for failure to comply with prescribed treatment. 65
According to the regulations, good cause may be found if the
particular treatment is contrary to the claimant's religion, if a
suggested surgery has been previously performed without success, or
if the particular treatment is very risky or would result in amputation
of a limb.6 6 Judge Meisburg notes that these regulations do not list
addiction as a justification for non-compliance. 67  However, the
regulations merely provide a list of examples and state that the finder
of fact will consider the claimant's "physical, mental, educational,
and linguistic limitations" when determining good cause.68 Based
upon this language in the regulations, several courts have suggested
that addiction to nicotine 69 may be a good reason for refusing to stop
smoking despite a doctor's orders.70
63. Seals, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
64. Id.
65. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (2005) (with reference to SSD benefits
and SSI benefits respectively).
66. Id.
67. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 39.
68. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530 (2006) (with reference to SSD benefits), 416.930
(with reference to SSI benefits). See also Social Security Program Policy
Statement: Title II and Title XVI Failure to Follow Prescribed Treatment, SSR 82-
59 (1982) (discussing justifications for non-compliance: "The specific reasons
listed above [the examples in the regulation] are not all-inclusive as acceptable
justifications for refusing to accept prescribed treatment. A full evaluation must be
made in each case to determine whether the individual's reason(s) for failure to
follow prescribed treatment is justifiable.").
69. Judge Meisburg also argues that "there is considerable debate . . . as to
whether cigarette smoking is addictive," Meisburg, supra note 6, at 39, however,
for purposes of this article it is assumed that nicotine is addictive, as recognized by
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Nicotine addiction has been likened to alcohol addiction by
several courts, in that continuing to smoke may not be a voluntary
decision of the claimant. 71  The Fourth Circuit has stated that
allegations of tobacco abuse should be treated in the same manner as
allegations of alcohol abuse, and benefits may only be denied on the
grounds of continued abuse after a finding has been made that
cessation has been prescribed and that "the claimant is able
voluntarily to stop."' 72 Judge Meisburg notes that many of the cases
dealing with voluntary ability to stop smoking were decided before
the DA&A analysis was put in place in 1996. 73 He argues that
claiming addiction under the current standards acts as a "double-
edged sword," in that a claimant could perhaps show a good reason
for failure to follow prescribed medical treatment but in so doing
would also demonstrate an addiction that would subject them to the
DA&A analysis.74 However, addiction to nicotine has been held to
constitute good reason for non-compliance as recently as March
2004,75 and, as will be discussed below, it is possible that the DA&A
the Surgeon General, the DSM-IV, and the case law of several circuits. See e.g.,
2004 Surgeon General's Report, supra note 1, at 15; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
FOURTH EDITION 175, 242 (4th ed. 1994) (hereinafter "DSM-IV"); and Weaver v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 82-0389-F, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26919, at *10
n.5 (D. Mass. 1986) (noting that consensus in medical community is that smoking
is addictive).
70. See e.g. Seals v. Barnhart, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (N.D. Ala. 2004);
Burnside v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 840, 843-44 (8th Cir. 2000); Gordon v. Schweiker,
725 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1984); Caprin v. Harris, 511 F. Supp. 589, 590
(N.D.N.Y. 1981).
71. See e.g. Seals, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1251; Carothers v. Heckler, 627 F. Supp.
301, 304 (W.D.N.C. 1985); Gordon, 725 F.2d at 236; Caprin, 511 F. Supp. at 590.
72. Gordon, 725 F.2d at 236.
73. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 40 n.7.
74. Id. at 39.
75. Seals, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1251:
Continuing to smoke, however, is often not a voluntary decision,
rational or otherwise, of the smoker .... Breaking an addiction
is not a simple matter or rationally deciding to cease the addictive
behavior, whether it be smoking, drinking, or drug abuse .... In
the case of nicotine addiction, the mere failure to successfully
stop smoking will not support a finding of willful refusal to try.
If the plaintiff was unable to stop smoking because she was
addicted to nicotine, her noncompliance would not be unjustified.
analysis does not apply to persons addicted to nicotine.7 6 Therefore, it
seems reasonable to assume that addiction to nicotine may serve as
justification for non-compliance with an order to stop smoking.
3. Restoration to the Work Force
Finally, with respect to the fourth factor of the test articulated
above, the finder of fact has the burden of showing by substantial
evidence that the treatment at issue could restore the claimant to the
work force." If the finder of fact fails to make this critical finding,
or if the finding is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record, the claimant may not be denied benefits on the basis of non-
compliance.78
With respect to this finding, the courts have held that mere
improvement of a disabling condition does not necessarily equal an
ability to return to work.7 9 Additionally, the finder of fact must make
the determination that a claimant could return to work if he or she
followed the prescribed treatment based on the "testimony and
medical evidence in the record." 80  In short, the A.L.J. may not
"make his own determination regarding the prognosis of recovery...
when the record [is] devoid of any evidence that [the claimant] could
return to work if she quit smoking." 8' The case law dealing with this
step four finding shows that a remand to the finder of fact is often
warranted due to insufficient evidence to support a finding of not
disabled at this step.
82
The burden is on the Commissioner to produce evidence of
unjustified noncompliance.
76. See infra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See also Seals, 308 F. Supp. 2d
at 1251 (quoting Patterson v. Bowen, 799 F. 2d 1455, 1460 (1 1th Cir. 1986)).
78. Seals, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
79. See, e.g., id. at 1252; Weaver, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26919, at *10 n.5;
Rousey v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 1985); Corrie v. Schweiker, No.
81-C-771,1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11167, at *7 n.5 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 7, 1982).
80. Rousey, 771 F.2d at 1069. See also Weakley v. Heckler, 795 F. 2d 64, 66
(10th Cir. 1986).
81. Rousey, 771 F.2d at 1069.
82. See e.g. Geubelle v. Barnhart, No. 02-1297-WEB, 2003 WL 22853100 (D.
Kan. Sept. 26, 2003); Burnside v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2000);
Rousey, 771 F.2d at 1071.
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IV. DA&A ANALYSIS - "STEP SIX" OF THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION
A. The DA&A Analysis and the Materiality Determination
The standard for denying benefits to alcoholics and drug addicts
under the DA&A analysis is set out in the current SSA regulations,
which state: if the finder of fact determines that the claimant is
disabled 83 and there is medical evidence in the record of drug
addiction or alcoholism, the DA&A analysis must be applied to
determine whether the claimant would still be disabled but for the
addiction or alcohol abuse. 84 The circuit courts place the burden of
proof on the claimant to show that alcoholism or addiction is not a
material factor in a Step Six determination under the DA&A
analysis 85
83. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing whether it is
necessary for the court to complete the five-step sequential evaluation as a
condition precedent before claimant's drug addiction or alcoholism is considered).
84. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (2005) (with reference to SSD benefits
and SSI benefits respectively). Internal SSA operating guidelines laid out in the
POMS state that the required medical evidence must be from an acceptable medical
source, defined in the POMS as a licensed physician, licensed or certified
psychologist, licensed optometrist, licensed podiatrist, or qualified speech-language
pathologist. POMS, supra note 26, at D190070.050 (DA&A Material
Determinations) and D122505.003.B.1 (Medical and Other Evidence of an
Individual's Impairments). According to these guidelines, the claimant's own
statements about whether or not he or she is addicted are considered "evidence" but
are never "sufficient and appropriate" to establish an addiction or alcoholism such
that the DA&A analysis must be applied. Id. at D190070.050. It should also be
noted that the DA&A analysis has withstood challenges to its constitutionality
based on the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. See e.g. Ball v.
Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Mitchell v. Commissioner,
182 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1999)); Mitchell v. Apfel, 19 F. Supp. 2d 523, 531 (D.N.C.
1998); Stengel v. Callahan, 983 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Il1. 1997). For an early
overview of the constitutionality of the DA&A analysis, see Nicole Fiocco, The
Unpopular Disabled: Drug Addicts and Alcoholics Lose Benefits, 49 ADMIN. L.
REv. 1007 (1997).
85. See e.g. Ingram v. Barnhart, 72 F. App'x 631, 634 (9th Cir. 2003);
Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 2003); Ball, 254 F.3d 817;
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Mittelstedt v. Apfel, 204 F.3d
847 (8th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Apfel, 192 F. 3d 492 (5th Cir. 1999).
The courts have stated that, per the SSA regulations, "The key
factor in determining the materiality of [drug addiction or
alcoholism] is whether the claimant would still be considered
disabled if she stopped using drugs or alcohol. 86 Under the SSA
regulations, the finder of fact will "evaluate which of [the claimant's]
current physical and mental limitations, upon which we based our
current disability determination, would remain if [the claimant]
stopped using drugs or alcohol and then determine whether any or all
of [the claimant's] remaining limitations would be disabling."87 This
language has been interpreted to include a finding of disability based
upon a combination of impairments that would remain and be severe
despite drug addiction or alcoholism, 88 and to require that the finder
of fact sufficiently differentiate between "substance abuse
contributing to the disability and the disability remaining after the
claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol. 89
Several courts have held that, in making the materiality
determination, one factor to consider is whether the claimant suffers
86. See e.g. Ingram, 72 F. App'x 634; Brueggemann, 348 F.3d at 693; Ford v.
Barnhart, 78 F. App'x 825, 830 (3d Cir. 2003). See also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1535(b)(1) (2006) (describing process for SSD determinations):
(b) Process we will follow when we have medical evidence of
your drug addiction or alcoholism. (1) The key factor we will
examine in determining whether drug addiction or alcoholism is
a contributing factor material to the determination of disability is
whether we would still find you disabled if you stopped using
drugs or alcohol.
(emphasis added); see also § 416.935(b)(1) (2006) (applying same
language to SSD determinations).
87. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(2), 416.935(b)(2).
88. Ingram, 72 F. App'x at 635.
89. Id. at 636 n.28 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.
1998)) (emphasis omitted). The court in Sousa held that these two categories of
disabilities are not mutually exclusive, and that "[]ust because substance abuse
contributes to a disability does not mean that when the substance abuse ends, the
disability will too." Id. See also Frederick v. Barnhart, 317 F. Supp. 2d 286, 293
(D.N.Y. 2004) (A.L.J. did not determine which of claimant's disabilities existed
independent of her alcohol abuse); White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 302 F. Supp. 2d
170, 174 (D.N.Y. 2004) (A.L.J.'s determination that claimant's alcoholism was
contributing factor to disability lacked substantial evidentiary support).
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from a disability independent of the drug or alcohol addiction.9 ° The
courts have been careful to note that while "drug addiction and
alcoholism inevitably contribute" to other impairments, contribution
alone "does not establish or even imply materiality."9 The Ninth
Circuit, in Lee v. Callahan, observed that the materiality
determination allows the claimant to qualify for benefits under the
DA&A analysis if the claimant's other impairments would prevent
the claimant from working regardless of whether those impairments
were originally caused by the claimant's alcoholism or drug
addiction.92 It has also been found insufficient for the finder of fact
to simply determine that the claimant's disabling conditions would
improve if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol.93
With these considerations in mind, it is the task of the finder of
fact, in applying the materiality standard, to determine "whether the
claimant's limitations would rise to the level of disability absent the
effects of drugs and alcohol. 94 If this process does not result in a
clear determination, benefits must be granted. 95
B. Does Nicotine Abuse Fall Under the DA&A Analysis?
The federal courts have not yet addressed the issue of nicotine
abuse under the DA&A analysis. In arguing that the DA&A analysis
should be applied to smokers, Judge Meisburg relies on the SSA
Programs Operating Manual System (POMS) to bring smokers under
90. See, e.g., Lee v. Callahan, 133 F. 3d 927, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1462 (9th
Cir. 1998); Stengel, 983 F. Supp. at 1165; Jones v. Apfel, 997 F. Supp. 1085 (N.D.
Ind. 1997).
91. Ingram, 72 F. App'x 637; see also Frederick, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 293;
Holmes-Lee v. Barnhart, No. 00-4144-JAR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19331 (D.
Kan. Oct. 3, 2002).
92. Lee, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1462, at *5. The decision of the Ninth Circuit
in Lee was not designated for publication, which may place limits upon its citation
value. See also, generally, Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of "Material Contributing Factor" Test under § 105 of the
"Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, " 42 U.S. C.A. § 423(d)(2)(C), in
Social Security Disability Cases, 151 A.L.R. FED. 533 (1999).
93. Frederick, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
94. Holmes-Lee, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19331, at * 19.
95. Bruggemann, 348 F.3d at 695.
the analysis. 96 The POMS states that, for purposes of the DA&A
analysis, medically determinable substance use disorders which
would be subject to the analysis "[a]re medical conditions described
as 'substance dependence' and 'substance abuse' disorders in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM-IV).' 97 The DSM-IV includes nicotine abuse as a
class of substance abuse disorders and states that nicotine
dependence can develop with use of all forms of tobacco or
prescription medications, such as nicotine gum or the nicotine
patch. 98 Therefore, Judge Meisburg concludes that under the POMS
nicotine addiction constitutes a drug addiction subject to the DA&A
analysis. 99
However, the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996
does not specifically state which drug addictions will qualify under
the DA&A analysis, and the terms "drug," "drug addiction," and
"substance use disorder" are not defined anywhere in the Act as a
whole or in the SSA regulations. 100 Additionally, the legislative
history of the Contract with America Advancement Act makes no
mention of nicotine or tobacco as "drugs" that were being considered
when this legislation was proposed.' 0 ' Four hearings were held
before various committees of the 104th Congress dealing specifically
with the DA&A provisions of the Contract with America
Advancement Act of 1996: Problems in the Social Security
Disability Programs: The Disabling ofAmerica?;102 Rising Costs of
Social Security's Disability Programs;1 °3  Growth of the
96. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 37.
97. POMS, supra note 26, at D190070.050C.2.
98. DSM-IV, supra note 68, at 175,242.
99. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 37.
100. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, §
105, 110 Stat. 847, 852-55 (1996).
101. See generally Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, 104
Cong. Info. Serv. Legis. Hist. P.L. 121 (1996) (providing a summary of the
materials included in the legislative history of the Contract with America
Advancement Act of 1996).
102. Problems in the Social Security Disability Programs: The Disabling of
America?: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Aging, 95 Cong. Info. Serv. S.
1418 (1995).
103. Rising Costs of Social Security's Disability Programs: Hearing before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 95 Cong. Info. Serv. S. 36147 (1995).
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Supplemental Security Income Program;10 4 and Managing the Social
Security Disability Insurance Program. 105 In fact, the only reference
made to smoking in the legislative history seems to indicate that
persons who use tobacco and suffer from related disabilities were not
included in the proposed class of drug addicts that would be denied
SSI or SSD benefits as a result of the Contract with America
Advancement Act of 1996:
Although it is certainly true that addicts played a
major role in the development of their disorder, the
same can be said for a number of other medical
conditions for which we do not deny individuals
coverage for treatment. The smoker who develops
cancer of the lung or a heart attack, the diabetic whose
lack of exercise and increased use of refined
carbohydrates leads to an exacerbation of his diabetes,
the hypertensive patient who fails to take his
hypertensive medication, are all treated very
differently by the medical and political system than
the addict. 106
When a statute is ambiguous on its face as to a particular issue,
the agency charged with administering that statute may promulgate
regulations that, if reasonable, will be entitled to deference by the
courts in resolving the ambiguous issue. 0 7 Agency interpretations
other than regulations which are not subject to the requirements of
104. Growth of the Supplemental Security Income Program: Hearing before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96 Cong. Info. Serv. S. 36118 (1995).
105. Managing the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearing
before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96 Cong. Info. Serv. H. 7817
(1995).
106. Growth of the Supplemental Security Income Program: Hearing before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, supra note 103 (statement of Herbert D. Kleber,
M.D., Executive Vice President and Medical Director, Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse, Columbia University Senate Finance Supplemental Security
Income Program).
107. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
the Administrative Procedures Act'08 - such as interpretations in
opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines - "lack the force of law" and "do not warrant Chevron-
style deference."'0 9 The Supreme Court has held that the POMS is
an administrative interpretation only, not the product of formal
rulemaking; the POMS therefore lacks the force of law and is not
binding on the SSA. 10
Agency interpretations that do not warrant Chevron-style
deference are only "entitled to respect" by the court to the extent that
those interpretations have the power to persuade."' Circuit courts
applying this standard to the POMS have held that the court will
affirm the agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless the
SSA interpretation as enunciated in the POMS is "arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to the law.""' 2 In short, these cases suggest
that application of the DA&A analysis to claimants who are addicted
to nicotine is not a foregone conclusion simply because the POMS
brings nicotine under the analysis; the issue is open to consideration
108. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. and §§ 701 et seq.
(2004) (hereinafter "APA").
109. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). For a discussion
of whether the SSA is required to publish provisions of the POMS in the Federal
Register pursuant to the APA, see Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that provisions of the claims manual at issue in the claim
were not "substantive rules" such that the APA requires publication in the Federal
Register; rather, the provisions were classified as "interpretive rules" - which are
exempt from the publication requirement - because the provisions did not change
existing law or policy, or remove any previously existing rights of social security
recipients, but only explained what the Act and the regulations already provided).
110. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 386 (2003); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 790
(1981).
111. Christensen, 529 U.S. 587, (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944)).
112. Neikirk v. Massanari, 13 F. App'x. 847, 849 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
McNamar v. Apfel, 127 F.3d 764, 766 (10th Cir. 1999)). See also Ingram v.
Barnhart, 72 F. App'x. 631, 636 n.30 (9th Cir. 2003); Henningson v. Dir, OWCP,
United States DOL, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22420 (10th Cir. 1999); Davis v. Sec'y
of Health & Human Serv., 867 F.2d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 1989); Evelyn v. Schweiker,
685 F.2d 351, 352 (9th Cir. 1982). For two recent applications of this standard by
district courts, see Finan v. Barnhart, 327 F. Supp 2d 1303, 1307 (D. Kan. 2004);
Raymond v. Barnhart, 214 F. Supp 2d 188 (D.N.H. 2002).
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by the courts under the standards articulated above, and the courts
have yet to address this particular issue.
B. Public Policy Arguments Related to Treatment of Nicotine
under the DA&A Analysis
Assuming that nicotine addiction falls under the DA&A analysis,
Judge Meisburg argues that the denial of benefits to claimants on the
grounds that nicotine addiction is material to the disabling condition
would have "an important public policy salutary effect.""' 3
Specifically, Judge Meisburg argues that such denials would serve to
"educate thousands of disability claimants as to the cause of their
diseases and will motivate them to quit smoking. ' 14 However, the
history of the public policy effects of the DA&A analysis with
respect to other drug addictions does not support this assertion;
rather, if history repeats itself, the denial of benefits on the basis of
nicotine addiction could have more detrimental than beneficial
effects, in terms of the rates of treatment, homelessness, drug usage,
and drug-related crime that would result from the loss of benefits.' 15
Several studies of persons whose benefits were terminated by the
1996 amendments support this outcome.' 16
In 2002, Dru Stevenson, a public benefits advocate and
researcher with Greater Hartford Legal Aid, wrote an article
collecting and analyzing the empirical data produced by studies of
persons whose benefits were terminated by the 1996 amendments
creating the DA&A analysis.117 These studies showed that "reform
measures [e.g., the 1996 amendments] did not foster incentives for
addicts to rehabilitate themselves at greater rates than when they
received benefits,"' ' 8 and that the "receipt of public benefits did not
113. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 40.
114. Id.
115. See infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text.
117. Stevenson, supra note 11 at 36.
118. Id. at 200 (noting that a Chicago-area study on the impact of the 1996
amendments on treatment participation found that patients were three times as
likely to drop out of their treatment after termination of benefits and that the
average length of treatment decreased 55% after the 1996 amendments were
implemented). See also id. at 196-98 (discussing the study conducted by the Lewin
encourage increased drug use, but lowered it."' 19  Addicts whose
benefits were terminated were less likely to seek and stay in
treatment, and more likely to become homeless, resort to crime rather
than returning to the work force, and commit suicide.' 20
These studies suggest, and Stevenson concludes, that while
withholding benefits could deter individuals from becoming addicts
in the first place, receipt of benefits by current addicts is unlikely to
increase consumption of the addictive substance, or "encourage or
increase drug or alcohol dependency." 121 Rather, "[p]ublic assistance
[such as SSI and SSD benefits] provides a stabilizing influence" in
the life of the addict, allowing the addict to retain housing and seek
professional treatment of the problem, two steps essential toward
recovery from addiction.' 22
Stevenson's conclusions were supported by the findings of the
"SSI Study," the results of which were published in 2003 in
Contemporary Drug Problems.123 The SSI Study surveyed a group
of former SSI recipients who lost their benefits due to the 1996
Group on behalf of the Social Security Administration in 1997 and 1998, which
"found 'virtual unanimity' that former beneficiary participation in treatment
programs 'dropped dramatically"' due to the loss of benefits, and the study
presented by the Association of Health Services Research, which found that one
year following the termination of benefits for addicts, participation in outpatient
treatment programs steadily declined, whereas those persons in treatment programs
whose benefits continued had higher levels of participation one year after the 1996
amendments).
119. Stevenson, supra note 11, at 201; see also id. at 196-201 (discussing the
particular studies used to come to this conclusion).
120. Id. at 196-201; see also Dean Spade, Undeserving Addicts: SSI/SSD and
the Penalties of Poverty, How. SCROLL Soc. JUST. L. REV. 89, 100 (discussing
studies tracking the effects of the 1996 amendments which found that persons who
lost benefits were more likely to be homeless, to engage in illegal activities, and
had an increased rate of substance abuse).
121. Stevenson, supra note 11, at 216, 219; see also Spade, supra note 119, at
101 (noting that studies have concluded that "disqualifying drug users from public
income supports may well increase drug use among [injection drug users]").
122. Stevenson, supra note 11, at 223.
123. 30 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 1, 1-537 (2003) (this journal devoted its 2003
Spring and Summer editions to the results of the SSI Study, published as 16 related
papers).
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amendments over the two years following loss of benefits. 2 4 This
study found that persons who lost SSI benefits only returned to the
work force in a relative minority of cases,'2 5 were more likely to
experience homelessness and hunger than persons who retained SSI
benefits, 126 and were not any more likely to stop using drugs or
alcohol than persons who retained benefits, a finding which was used
to support the conclusion that "cash assistance programs [do not]
promote continued substance abuse."' 27 The SSI Study also found
that persons who lost SSI benefits were less likely to participate in
treatment programs and more likely to commit drug-related
crimes.' 28
As demonstrated by these studies, a flat denial of benefits under
the DA&A analysis seems to have several negative consequences for
the claimant, and therefore, the public at large: claimants are less
likely to seek treatment that could enable them to return to the work
force and more likely to encounter the social pitfalls of homelessness,
124. See James Swartz et al., The Methodology of the Multi-Site Study of the
Termination of Supplemental Security Income Benefits for Drug Addicts and
Alcoholics, 30 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 77 (2003) (discussing the quantitative and
qualitative methodologies used in the SSI Study).
125. See Kevin Campbell et al., The Bottom Line: Employment and Barriers to
Work Among Former SSI DA&A Beneficiaries, 30 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 195,
195 (2003) (finding that of the former beneficiaries surveyed, only 25% earned
$500 or more per month, and only 12% earned that much throughout the two-year
period of the study, and concluding that many former beneficiaries would remain
indigent).
126. See Jean Norris et al., Homelessness, Hunger and Material Hardship
Among Those Who Lost SSI, 30 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 241, 256-58 (2003).
127. See Richard Speiglman et al., SSI Receipt and Alcohol and Other Drug
Use Among Former SSI DA&A Beneficiaries, 30 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 291, 325
(2003).
128. See James A. Swartz et al., Drug Treatment Participation and Retention
Rates Among Former Recipients of Supplemental Security Income for Drug
Addiction and Alcoholism, 30 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 335 (2003). See also
Deborah Podus et al., Medical and Mental Health Services Utilization Among
Requalified and Former Drug Addiction and Alcoholism Recipients of SSI, 30
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 365, 383 (2003) (finding that persons who lost SSI
benefits were significantly less likely to receive medical care, mental health care, or
both, than persons who re-qualified for benefits, and concluding that "[t]his
disparity confirms the frequent finding of lower access to care for uninsured groups
and, for this population, appears to be an adverse impact associated with the policy
change [of implementation of the 1996 amendments]").
increased illegal activity, and increased drug use.'29 Rather than
having a "public policy salutary effect,"' 30 this program appears to be
capable of doing more harm than good.
The argument could be made that the denial of benefits based on
nicotine abuse is unlikely to have the same or similar results
demonstrated by studies focusing on intravenous or illegal drug
abuse, or alcohol, since nicotine is not only less expensive than
intravenous or illegal drugs, but also legal for adults to purchase.
However, alcohol is also less expensive than intravenous drugs and
legal for adults to purchase, yet it is included in the DA&A analysis
and denial of benefits on this basis has resulted in the negative public
policy effects discussed above.131 As noted during the discussion of
the duty to follow prescribed treatment, several courts have already
recognized the similarities between addiction to nicotine and
alcoholism.'32 If it is assumed, for the purposes of argument, that
nicotine addiction falls under the DA&A analysis, it seems only fair
to also assume that denial of benefits based on nicotine addiction will
have similar effects on disability claimants as seen with the denial of
benefits based on alcoholism. As discussed in this section, these
effects would likely have a greater negative impact than a "salutary
effect"133 in terms of public policy.
V. CONCLUSION
As mentioned above, Judge Meisburg's most recent treatment of
the issue of nicotine abuse and disability concludes that "disability
benefits can and should be denied" to smokers. 134 While the law
with respect to the duty to follow prescribed medical treatment and
the DA&A analysis makes it possible for the finder of fact in a
disability determination to deny benefits on the grounds of continued
tobacco abuse, the issue of whether the finder of fact should do so is
not so clear. The law of the circuit courts has created as many
129. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
130. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 40.
131. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
133. Meisburg, supra note 6, at 40.
134. Id.
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questions as answers in the "prescribed treatment" determination,
making it clear that a blanket prohibition simply will not do.'
35
Additionally, the law related to whether the DA&A analysis will
even apply to nicotine addiction is unsettled and perhaps not as clear-
cut, even in theory, as Judge Meisburg would have it be. 136
Overall, it appears that a hard and fast rule denying benefits to
smokers based either upon the failure to follow prescribed treatment
or the DA&A analysis is not warranted by the current state of the
law, and, as a matter of public policy, is perhaps not the best course
of action. While it is undeniable that tobacco abuse is a highly
relevant issue with respect to Social Security law and the general
health of the nation, the harsh treatment of Social Security claimants
suggested by Judge Meisburg is not the only, or perhaps even the
wisest, course of action. Under the current law, it seems that a case-
by-case determination of the level of impact tobacco abuse will have
on the disability determination is warranted, with special attention
given to the concerns articulated by the courts in the four-factor
"prescribed treatment" analysis and any future decisions that may
decide whether the DA&A analysis should in fact be applied to
nicotine addicts, so that disability claimants who are also smokers
can receive a fair and equitable determination of their claims, and the
public in general can derive the most benefit possible from the laws
that Congress and the Social Security Administration have seen fit to
enact.
135. Supra notes 45-81 and accompanying text.
136. Supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
